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~) AA1.-~~C() . . -, ~ Summary: Appts, two i daho off1c1als, seek reversa l 
of th e Fifth Circuit's rulinq that Idaho's corporat e takeover 
... -- -
statute is unconstitutional, as it is preempted by the Williams 
---~------------Act and places an unjustified burden on interstate comme rce. -'S:m-y -11,1> 1'7 So l <»>~, bJ-~ t~ S~r I 9\tt..,f to lML • r 
~tct ~k ~· 1>0/\.1~ ~ VleMJ~ 0 <)~ c;,~lo( k 
I I • I \ )~,rJ 
r 
Appts argue: (1) that the suit against them in Texas federal 
' . 
court was barred under the Eleventh Amendment and principles of 
federalism~ (2) that the Texas court's assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over them violated due process, as interpreted in 
International Shoe Co. v. ·washinqton, 326 u.s. 310 (1945)~ (3) 
that venue was improperly laid in Texas~ (4) that the Idaho 
takeover statute does not contradict the purposes of the 
Williams Act~ and (5) that the Idaho statute does not place an 
unacceptable burden on interstate commerce. 
2. Facts and Prior Decisions: Appee is a nationally 
-----------
traded, Delaware corporation whose central offices are in 
Dallas, Texas. In early 1977, appee proposed a tender offer for 
~
two million common shares of the Sunshine Mining Company, a 
~-----------------
nationally traded, Washington company whose principal mining 
operation is located in Idaho. Immediately upon making the 
offer for the stock, appee's representatives filed a 13D 
disclosure statement with the SEC, as required under the 
Williams Act, 15 u.s.c. §§78m(d)&(e). At the same time, appee 
filed an information statement with the Idaho authorities, as 
required under the Idaho Corporation Takeover Law, Idaho Code 
§§30-1501 to 1513; appee also contacted officials in New York 
and Maryland concerning the possible application of those 
states' laws concerning the proposed purchase of Sunshine 
shares. 
Four days after receiPt of the information statement, 





ordered appee's tender offer delayed and telephoned officials of 
appee in Texas to request more information concerning the nature 
of the offer. On March 28, 1977, appee filed the instant action 
in federal district court in the Northern District of Texas, 
_.____-----.._,__ -~ --
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the --------- -----...__ --......__ - -
enforcement of the Idaho takeover statute. The Idaho Attorney 
~ --~- ---...... --..._ 
General (appt Kidwell) and appt McEldowney were the named 
defendants. After an initial skirmish over a preliminary 
injunction, the case was heard on May 23 and 24, 1977, and the 
district court issued its 40 page opinion on September 2. 
The district court first considered appee's standing to 
object to Idaho's takeover statute. Thus, the court noted that 
in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977), this 
Court ruled that the Williams Act does not give rise to a 
private cause of action for damages on behalf of a tender 
offeror, as the Act was intended for the benefit only of 
shareholders of target companies. The district court concluded 
that it nonethelesss was "free to hold that the Congressional 
policy of even-handedness is probative of its intent to grant 
standing to tender offerors and target management for 
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Williams Act," as 
I this Court specifically reserved the question of relief other than money damages in Piper. 
Second, the district court ruled that any Eleventh 
Amendment protection of the State of Idaho from suit in federal 





Third, the court concluded that it had personal 
jurisdiction over appts with respect to their enforcement of 
Idaho's takeover statute. As the Idaho statute prohibits appee 
from making a tender offer in Texas until Idaho law has been 
complied with, appts had minimum contacts with Texas under 
International Shoe, supra. The court indicated that its ruling 
would not extend in general to any state statute whose 
enforcement would have only a remote effect in other states. 
The Idaho statute is a unique form of state regulation, as it is 
intended to regulate commercial transactions occurring entirely 
outside the borders of Idaho. Under such circumstances, it 
r comports with fundamental fairness for Texas courts to exercise 
·.....___ 
personal jurisdiction over Idaho officials charged with 
enforcing 
Fourth, the district court found that venue was 
properly laid in the Northern District of Texas, as §27 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that venue for any 
action brought to redress a violation of the Act may be brought 
"in any district ... wherein any act or transaction constituting 
the violation occurred ...• " The court ruled that the violation 
here occurred in Texas because that was where the statute was 
being enforced. 
On the merits, the district court ruled that the Idaho 
takeover statute was unconstitutional under both the Supremacy 
~ ~ ~----------------------Clause and the Commerce Clause. The court opined that the Idaho 
statute had been preempted by the Williams Act because it 
conflicted the with basic purpose behind the federal act: to 
"balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate interests 
of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly 
impeding cash takeover bids." Thus, the court noted that the 
Idaho statute requires more detailed disclosure than does the 
Williams Act, and that only the Ida~o act provides a waiting 
period between disclosure and the consummation of the tender 
offer. These differences, the district court concluded, destroy 
the delicate balance provided for under the Williams Act. 
In addition, applying the criteria set forth in Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137 (1970), the district court 
ruled that the Idaho statute places an improper burden on 
interstate commerce. The court found the purpose of the Idaho 
statute to be the protection of incumbent management, a purpose 
the court considered to be improper. Moreover, the effect on 
interstate commerce of the Idaho law is great, as it purports to 
regulate all takeover transactions which affect Idaho business, 
not just sales of shares by Idaho shareholders. Accordingly, 
the district court declared the Idaho statute to be 
unconstitutional, and enjoined appts from enforcing the 
statute's provisions. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in a 63 page 
opinion. Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, concurred in the 
~ 
district court's ruling that Ex ·parte Younq does not require 




in the officers' home states. More0v.er, the appeals court 
opined that the district court had personal iurisdiction over 
appts, as they had acted directly to affect commercial 
transactions in Texas, thereby establishing minimum contacts 
with that state. The court distinguished this Court's ruling in 
Kulko v. Superior Court, u.s. , 98 s.ct. 1960 (1978), saying 
that the effects in Texas of the Idaho statute's enforcement 
against a Texas corporation were substantially greater and more 
immediate than the effects in California of a father's consent 
for his children to live with their mother. 
As for venue, Judge Wisdom wrote that there were two 
independent reasons why this action properly was brought in the 
Northern District of Texas. First, the court agreed with the 
district court that §27 of the '34 Act laid venue in the place 
where the violation occurred, and here the violation occurred in 
Texas, the place where the Idaho Act was enforced against 
appees. Second, the court opined that the general federal venue 
statute, 28 u.s.c. §1391(b) lays venue in Texas, as that was 
where the claim arose. 
~ 
On the merits, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the Idaho 
takeover statute was unconstitutional under both the Supremacy 
and Interstate Commerce Clauses. Applying the standard this 
Court laid down in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 u.s. 52, 67 (1940), 
the court concluded that the Idaho law "stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
.I objectives of Congress," as expressed in the Williams Act. In 
( the court's view, the conflict between the two statutes lies in 
their different approaches to the protection of investors: The 
~--
Williams Act is based on a "market approach," under which 
accurate information is placed before the shareholders of the 
target company and they are permitted to decide whether to 
accept the offer; The Idaho statute, on the other hand, is 
based ona"fiduciary approach," as the primary emphasis is upon 
~ -
placing before the directors of the target company the details 
of the offer and allowing them to decide whether or not to 
recommend that the stockholders accept the deal. 
Like the district court, the court of appeals analyzed 
the Commerce Clause challenge to the Idaho statute in light of 
this Court's deicision in Pike · v~ Bruce Church, Inc., supra. 
Unlike the district court, however, Judge Wisdom found two 
legitimate purposes that may underlie the Idaho law: the 
encouragement of responsible management, and protection of 
investors. Because the takeover statute has a severe impact 
upon interstate commerce, the court nonetheless ruled that the 
act "iolateo the Commerce Clause, as it was not carefully 
tailored to promote these admittedly legitimate state interests. 
Judge Godbold dissented with respect to personal 
- -------~ 
~---------------------~----------jurisdiction only; with respect to venue, sovereign immunity, 
-----v-
subject matter jurisdiction, and the merits, Judge Godbold 
agreed with the majority. The dissent argued that none of the 
traditional indices of personal jurisdiction are present here. 
Appts did not avail themselves of the benefits and protections 
7. 
( of Texas law. The minimum contacts between appts and Texas are 
of the most attenuated kind: the mere effect of the enforcement 
of a state law on residents of another state. Texas has no 
particular interest in supplying a forum for actions of this 
sort, which is neither tortious nor commercial. Finally, the 
dissent expressed concern that the majority's rule could not 
fairly be limited to state takeover .statutes, but rather would 
extend the federal courts' personal jurisdiction to any state 
officer enforcing a statute with some effect upon a resident of 
the forum. 
3. Contentions: Appts make four contentions. First, 
they argue that Ex parte Young should not be extended to permit 
suits against officers outside of the officers' states. Appts 
do not indicate that there is any conflict among the circuits 
concerning this point. Nonetheless, they contend that it is 
contrary to the basic principles of federalism represented by 
the Eleventh Amendment to permit such suits, and that the 
anomaly of Ex parte Younq should be extended no further. 
Second, appts argue that there was no personal 
jurisdiction over them in Texas, as they had no minimum contacts 
with Texas under International Shoe. Appts disagree with the 
Fifth Circuit's conclusion that this case is distinguishable 
from the decision last Term in Kulko v~ Superior Court. 
' "'--
Moreover, appts argue that it was fundamentally unfair to 
require them to travel to Texas to defend the propriety of their 
enforcement of an Idaho statute. 
B. 
/ Third, appts argue that venue was not properly laid in 
Texas. Thus, they contend that, i£ the general provisions of 28 
u.s.c. §1391(b) were construed to permit venue wherever the 
effects of a state statute were felt, then venue could be laid 
virtually anywhere in the United States. Furthermore, appts 
take issue with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the 
enforcement of a statute arguably preempted by the Williams Act 
constitutes a "violation" of the Securities Acts, as that term 
is used in §27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
Finally, appts argue that their takeover statute should 
be found to be preempted by the Williams Act only if it would be 
impossible to comply with both the federal and state acts at the 
same time. Furthermore, even under the more liberal 
understanding of the Fifth Circuit concerning preemption, the 
Idaho statute is unobjectionable because it does not conflict 
with the purposes behind the Williams Act; indeed, it furthers 
the primary purpose of protecting the investor in the target 
company. The explicit language of §28(a) of the Exchange Act 
anticipates that states will be permitted to enact statutes such 
as that challenged here, as it provides that, "nothing in this 
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities 
commission ••. of any State over any security or any person 
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter." 
As for the Commerce Clause challenge, appts contend 
that the Idaho statute places no onerous burden on interstate 
1 0. 
commerce, and that the requests for .additional information made 
by appts in this case were not unreasonable. 
The States of California and Indiana have filed briefs 
as amicus curiae in support of a?pts' jurisdictional statement. 
In these briefs, the States urge the Court to give plenary 
consideration to this case to resolve the scope of federal 
courts' jurisdiction to entertain suits against officers of 
states other than the forum state. 
In its motion to affirm, appee tracks the analysis of 
the Fifth Circuit. 
4. Discussion: Appt's Ex ·parte Young claim raises no 
issue with respect to which there is a division among the 
circuits, and there is no self-evident reason why the Eleventh L~< 
Amendment would restrict officers suits to being brought in 
federal courts within the state of the officer. Although the 
standing of a tender offeror to seek injunctive relief for 
Williams Act violations is an open question, there is no 
conflict, and appts only mention the point in their 
jurisdictional statement. There are, therefore, three issues of ~ 
substance here: (1) the personal jurisdiction of the Texas 
court over appts; (2) venue; and (3) the constitutionality of 
the Idaho statute. 
(1) Personal Jurisdiction 
There is no question that the Fifth Circuit applied the 
proper standards in determining whether the district court '- _.,.._. 
properly had exercised personal jurisdiction over appts. 
International Shoe and its l?rogeny re.quire that a court look to 
the fundamental fairness of the defendant being required to 
~~ ~-·~--------~--~~~----~ 
appear i a particular forum and defend an action. This ------ --------· --'- ~ 
fairness depends primarily upon the nexus between the action, 
the forum, and the parties. Moreover, it may be that 
Circuit's decision fairly can be limitea- to ~pecif.ic __ o_r--ders~ - ~- --. '---.--- . 
1ssued to out of state res1dents under particularly onerous and - -
extra-territorial statutes. Nonetheless, the result obtained by ......___ -
the courts below is troubling. The spectre Judge Godbold poses --- - ·- .>--.... ~ .,. _ _.._ 
of state officials being called all over the country to defend 
their state statutes that have some extra-territorial effect 
see/ms a real danger under the Fifth Circuit's analysis here. 
The question of the application of International Shoe to 
officers suits outside the state whose statute is being 
challenged independently is worthy of the Court's plenary 
consideration, therefore. 
(2) Venue 
It is of course difficult to separate the question of 
venue from that of personal jurisdiction, as the danger of suits 
------------------------------in far-off states can be taken care of by clever use of either 
device. Saying the claim here arose in Texas because the effect 
of the enforcement of the Idaho statute was felt in Texas seems 
tantamount to saying that venue could have been laid anywhere in 
the country--a rather extreme result. Moreover, it seems 
questionable whether Idaho's enforcement of its statute fairly 
could be characterized as a 11 Violation 11 of the securities acts. 
(3) Merits ' . 
The question of the constitutionality of state takeover 
statutes is an important on~ that has been discussed much in the 
literature. See, e.g., E. Aranow, Developments in Tender Offers 
for Corporate Cont~ol (1977); Note, State Takeover St&tutes 
Versus Congressional Intent: Preempting the Maze, 5 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 857 (1977); Note Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State 
Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (1974). It 
appears that the Fifth Circuit is the first to address the 
question, and therefore there is r.o conflict. Waiting for a 
conflict to develop may be unwise here, however, as the issue is 
of critical importance, and, as it now stands, Idaho is without 
a takeover statute. At the same time, the Court must consider 
that, if it notes this case, the jurisdiction and venue problems 
may preclude it from reaching the Williams Act or Commerce 
Clause questions. 
There is a response and two amicus briefs. Jurisdiction 
be noted. 
12/18/78 W~tin Oos. of CAS and DC in juris.state. 
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Re: No. 78-759, Kidwell v~ ·Great ·western United Corp~ 
The various questions presented in this case may be 
assembled as two broad issues: the personal jurisdiction of 
the DC over the appellants, and the validity of the Idaho 
corporate takeover statute under the Commerce Clause, the 
Supremacy Clause, and the federal securities laws, particularly 
the Williams Act. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the DC, 
and concluded that the Idaho law is repugnant to both the 
Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. Part I of this 
memorandum deals with the jurisdictional issue, which comprises 
questions regarding Ex parte · Young, ·personal jurisdiction, and 
venue in the Texas DC. Part II of this memorandum deals with 
the pre-emption question, concentrating on the relationship 
between the Williams Act and the Idaho statute. 
Both the Attorney General and the Director of the 
2. 
' . 
Department of Finance of the State of Idaho seek to appear as 
appellants in this case. But it is clear from the opinion of 
the CA below that the Idaho Attorney General did not appeal to ~ 
that court from the decision of the DC. Accordingly, he is not~ 
a proper party to this appeal. 
I 
Personal Jurisdiction over the · Appellants 
The appellants, Idaho officials charged with the 
enforcement of that State's corporate takeover statute, make 
three arguments regarding the authority of the federal DC in 
Texas to try this case. 
A. Ex · part~ · Yoang 
The appellants contend that a suit against a state 
official under Ex · parte · Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), can only be 
maintained within the district where the state official resides 
in his official capacity. In support of this contention, the 
appellants aver that every case in which the doctrine of Ex 
parte · Young has been relied upon has been brought in the 
district in which the defendant state official resided. And 
they cite two district court cases which they claim were 
dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction because the 
plaintiffs there sought to found jurisdiction over officials of 
other States on Ex parte Young. Turner v~ · Baxley, 354 F.Supp. 
3. 
963 (D.Vt. 1972)~ Idaho · Potato · Comm•n · v; · washington · Potato 
Comm'n, 410 F.Supp. 171 (D.Idaho 1976). 
The appellee convincingly rebuts appellants arguments 
on this point. First, nothing in the theory of Ex · parte · Young 
supports the limitation that appellants suggest. A state 
official attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law is ------ --- . .......________ ~
stripped of the immunity enioyed by the State. Thereafter, he 
is treated as a private litigant. If jurisdiction over him in 
a federal DC in some other State is authorized by statute and 
consistent with constitutional constraints, then he is obliged 
to defend a suit brought against him in that district. 
Appellee points out that Turner · v~ Baxley, supra, turned on a 
determination that the nonresident state officials lacked 
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to support personal 
jurisdiction, and that Idaho Potato · Comm'n v~ Washington · Potato 
Comm'n, supra, rested on a similar finding. 
B. Statutory and · Constitutiona! ·.Bases · for · Per§onal 
Jurisdiction 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) (7), service 
of process to secure persqnal jurisdiction over an individual 
defendant "is ••• sufficient if the summons and complaint are 
served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United 
States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in 
which the district court is held •••. " The CA held that the 
DC in Texas acquired jurisdiction over the appellants under 
4. 
~ v-- T -e-;.., ~ ~-t.- ~~ (rlA- ,2::zt>~ 
~ · (_ tj ~ ~ 5~/4(2-Ji'Z.7 ,y( 5Lf~ 
both the Texas long-arm statute and Section 27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa. The 
appellants attack each of these bases for jurisdiction. 
The appellants first contend that they did not fall 
within the terms of the Texas long-arm statute. They 
acknowledge that the Texas courts have held repeatedly that the 
reach of the statute is coextensive with the federal 
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the 
due process clause. See, e~g~, u~Anchor · Advertising, · Inc~ · v. 
~' 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 
1235 (1978). But they insist that the statute is not intended 
to reach defendants other than those who engage in commercial 
activity in Texas. Appellants base this argument on the 
language of the section of the long-arm statute relied upon by 
appellee and the lower courts, which subjects to service of 
process" [a]ny ••. non-resident natural person that engages in 
business in this State •.•• " Because their only activity was 
not business but governmental regulation, the appellants 
contend, they did not fall within the terms of the statute. 
The appellee briefly and convincingly refutes the 
II~ 
appellants' statutory argument. First, both the DC and the~· 
5 have agreed that the Texas statute extends its coverage to
the appellants. There is little warrant for this Court to ~~ 
disagree with their construction of Texas law. Moreover, a~~ 
careful reading of the Texas statute and related caselaw seems ~ dL/ 
~ 
to indicate that the "doing business" terminology in the -------------------...------------ --
statute no longer has any particular commercial reference. The 
.........____ __ p---.....-.........-·--~-~'------~-........_----....__.----- --......._ .. -- ---........_ __ .----......_---------
statute provides, in part 
"For the purpose of this Act, and without including 
other acts that may constitute doinq business, any 
... non-resident natural person shall be deemed 
doing business in this State by entering into 
contract by mail ••• or the committing of any tort 
in whole or in part in this State." 
The commission of a tort is not commercial activity, yet is 
defined by the statute to fall within the "doing business" 
coverage of the law. Thus, there is no particular reason to 
look askance at the conclusion of the court's below that 
appellants' activities also fall within the terms of the 
statute. And the Texas courts have indicated that the statute 
is to be construed to obviate any question save the federal 
-
constitutional inquiry as to the limits of due process. u~ 
5. 
Anchor · Advertising;; · Inc~ v~ Burt, supra. ~ ~ 
The remaining question, then, is whether the due~ 
process clause allows a DC in Texas to exercise jurisdict
over the appellants. At a general level, the parties agree ·~~)?~ ------that this question is controlled by the principle announced in 
International · Shoe · Co; v; -washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
Jurisdiction is constitutional if the defendant had "such 
contacts .•• with the state of the forum as make it 
in the context of our federal system of government, to 
the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought 
there." ~.,at 317. The appellants argue that their 
' . 
contacts with Texas were inadequate to support jurisdiction. 
They support this argument in two ways. 
First, they cull phrases from some of this Court's 
cases since International · Shoe. They rely, for example, on the 
statement in Kulko · v~ · superior Court, 436 u.s. 84 (1978), that 
the lower court's reliance on a defendant "having caused an 
'effect' in [the forum state] was misplaced". From this they 
argue that it was error for the lower courts to refer to the 
effect of the Idaho law and its enforcement on the activities 
of the appellee in Texas. Similarly, citing International · Shoe 
and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), appellants argue 
that they did not "exercise the privilege of conducting 
activities in [Texas], [or] enjoy the benefits and protections 
of the laws of that state." International Shoe, supra, at 319. 
Second, the appellants develop a "slippery slope" 
argument that if jurisdiction is sustained here, state 
officials will be summoned all over the country to defend 
against actions to enjoin their enforcement of all manner of 
state laws. As an example, they cite California officials who 
enforce that State's air quality laws to automobiles coming 
into the State. The argue that under the decision of the lower 
courts in the present case, California officials could be 
forced to defend a constitutional challenge to their statute in 
the Michigan courts, since by influencing the production 




has a "practical, extra-territorial effect" in Michigan. As 
other examples of state laws with extra-territorial effects, 
the appellants cite domestic relations laws and corporate law. 
I think that the appellants have misstated the 
development of the law of personal jurisdiction in this Court's 
decisions since International · Shoe. Although the slippery 
slope argument merits serious consideration, I think that it, 
too, is probably inadequate to sustain the appellants' 
position. 
I{ ~ 
The general fairness standard announced in 
International Shoe cannot be reduced to a precise set of tests 
or rules, and that has not been the Court's enterprise in the 
cases since International Shoe. Rather, the Court has taken a 
number of cases to illustrate the application of the general 
International Shoe standard to a variety of jurisdictional 
problems. In McGee · v~ International · Life · Ins~ eo~, 355 U.S. 
220 (1957), for example, the Court considered a situation in 
which, unlike International Shoe, no employee of the defendant 
conducted any activity inside the forum. Rather, the only 
contact of the defendant insurance company with the forum state 
~ 
was the mailing of the policy into the state. In Shaffer · v~ 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court explained the 
application of Intenational · Shoe principles to in rem 
jurisdiction. And in Kulko · v~ · superior ·eourt, 436 u.s. 84 
(9178), the Court considered the personal jurisdiction problems 
' . 
raised in a domestic law case. 
The present case calls upon the Court once again to 
demonstrate the International - Shoe analysis in a new context 
that of a suit to enjoin a state official from enforcement of a 
state statute that criminalizes activities conducted outside f 
the state. Just as in the Court's previous cases in this area, 
the factual context is so different from prior cases that 
~ precedential guidance is 
~..,..~ pr1nc1ple. That general 
~some purposeful activity 
available only at the level of general 
principle is familiar enough -- has 
on the part of the defendant created 
some contact with the forum that is significant enough to make 
it fair, within our federal system, to require the defendant to 
defend the suit in the forum. 
B. 
I think that this inquiry should be concluded in favor ~ 
of jurisdiction in the present case. The Idaho statute 
purports to restrict the right of the Texas corporation to 
___ .-.....,_--..__ -~~---..... ---- .- ----
enter into transactions with shareholders of the target -. 
'-~ -~~-------------------------
corporation in Texas and every other State, as well as to - --------- --
regulate transactions within Idaho. Pursuant to that statute, 
the appellants sent an order to the appellee instructing it to 
defer its tender offer because of noncompliance with Idaho's 
statute. Failure to comply with that order would have been a 
violation of the Idaho law, subjecting the appellee's officers 
and directors to indictment in Idaho and extradition from 
Texas. The application of the Idaho statute does not depend 
9 . 
' . 
upon the residence within Idaho of any shareholders of the 
target corporation, but only on the location there of the 
incorporation, offices, or assets of the target corporation. 
When a state passes a statute directly regulating activity 
b~s, on pain of criminal penalties for ~ 
noncompliance, I see no unfairness in requiring the officials 
- - - · - ---------- .........____._ -----------
of that State to defend that law from suits for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in the fora where the regulated activities 
occur. 
Nor do I think that this situation is difficult to 
distinguish from the mine run of state laws that regulate 
activity within the State itself. To take the appellants' 
example, the California air quality statute only regulates the 
emissions of automobiles within California. It does not 
regulate or impose criminal sanctions on the manufacture, sale, 
or use of automobiles outside the State of California. I would 
not think that a suit challenging such a law could be 
maintained outside of California, and I also think that this 
conclusion is consistent with sustaining the Texas DC's 
personal jurisdiction over appellants in the present case. 
Because the Texas long-arm statute supplies an 
adequate statutory ground for the jurisdiction of the DC, I 
will not analyze the arguments of the parties concerning 
personal jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Securities 




regard is whether enforcement of a state law that is pre-empted 
by the 1934 Act would constitute a "violation" of the 1934 Act 
within the meaning of Section 27, the jurisdictional provision 
of the 1934 Act. My own view is that it would not. Even if --the Idaho statute is pre-empted, the official actions taken to 
enforce it do not violate any of the proscriptions contained in 
the 1934 Act. Rather, those actions are forbidden by the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
Before leaving Section 27, I would call to your 
-----·----
attention also the suggestion in the appellee's Brief that in 
federal question cases, the due process-minimum contacts 
analysis is relevant to personal jurisdiction only if (i) that 
jurisdiction rests on a state long-arm law incorporated into 
federal law, and (ii) the state law is written or construed (as 
a matter of state law) in terms of the federal due process 
standard. In the present case, for example, jurisdiction might 
be based on the incorporation of the Texas long-arm statute by 
Rule 4. And since the Texas courts have construed the Texas 
statute to extend jurisdiction ot the limits of due process, 
the minimum contacts analysis that defines those limits is 
relevant. But it is relevant to the proper interpretation of 
the state law, and not to a determination of the constitutional 
limits on federal court jurisdiction. Thus, appellees argue, 
if jurisdiction rests instead on some federal statute (such as 
§ 27 of the 1934 Act, in the present case), then there is no 
' . 
need for the minimum contacts analysis. Personal jurisdiction 
by any federal court is consistent with the Constitution. As 
the appellee puts it in its Brief, at 49, "Only the ·territorial 
limits of the United States circumscribe the validity of 
federal process." 
This theory, also suggested in footnote 1 of the SG's 
Brief, is a throwback to the territorial-power theory of 
jurisdiction embodied in Pennoyer · v~ ·Neff, and rejected by this 
Court in the area of state court jurisdiction since 
International Shoe. I see no reason why the theory should be 
retained in discussing the personal jurisdiction of federal 
courts around the country. Rather, I would think it proper to 
apply the same test of minimum contacts with the forum, i.e., 
the district in which the federal court is held, to ascertain 
the fairness of calling the defendant to defend the suit in 
that place. 
C. Venue in the · DC in · Texas 
The general venue statute applicable to the present 
case is 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), which provides: 
"A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded 
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought 
only in the judicial district where all defendants 
reside, or in which the claim arose, except as 
otherwise provided by law." 
In his treatise on federal practice, Professor Moore suggests 
that venue should be proper under §1391 in any district in 
which compulsory process against the defendant is available. 
1 1 0 
The CA acknowledged the advantages that follow from such a 
construction, but also recognized that there is considerable 
support for the contrary position that a claim "arises" in only 
one district for purposes of §1391. 
The CA found no necessity to resolve this disputed 
statutory construction, however, because it concluded that in 
the present case, the claim "arose" in Texas. There is some 
precedential support for this position in the decisions of the 
lower federal courts. Moreover, in the context of an action 
for declaratory and injunctive relief against a criminal 
statute, this construction of the statute makes sense. The 
Idaho statute under which the appellants acted purports to 
control the activities of the appellee in Texas. The claim of 
the appellee to be free of the Idaho statute thus sensibly may 
~
be said to "arise" at the place where the appellee seeks to 
perform the actions -- making the tender offer -- that 
~
appellants purport to control by reason of the Idaho law. 
II 
Validity of · the · Idaho · statute 
The CA found the Idaho statute invalid on both 
Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause grounds. In view of the 
direct and substantial burden imposed by the Idaho statute on 
interstate commerce in securities, I think that th Commerce 
invalidation of the state law. I also 




Compliance with the state law does not make compliance 
with the Williams Act impossible. But the Court has never 
required a showing of such severe inconsistency between a state 
and a federal law to support a conclusion that the state law is 
pre-empted. Rather, either "occupation of the field" by the 
federal law, or a finding that the state "law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress", are sufficient to show 
pre-emption. Ray · v; · Atlantic Richfield · Co., 435 u.s. 151, 158 
(1978). It seems to me that under either of these two formulas 
the Idaho statute is pre-empted. 
The Williams Act is a comprehensive 
~~ 
regulation of 
tender offers for corporate control. It controls the actions ~ 
of both the offeror and the target company during the offer, 
all with a view to protecting the interests of the shareholders (/ 
of the target company. 
'---------------'-' 
It makes no provision for the 
incorporation of state takeover statutes that impose additional 
requirements on offerors and target companies. Accordingly, I 
think that one can conclude reasonably that Congress has 
occupied this field of regulation, and that state regulation is 
-----------~,----------------ousted. 
On the basis of a more detailed comparison of the 
Williams Act and the Idaho statute, I also think that one must 
conclude that the state law frustrates accomplishment of the 
1 4 0 
' . 
congressional objectives underlying the Williams Act. The 
legislative history of that Act, as stated in the CA opinion 
and the briefs of the appellee and the SEC, indicates that the 
overriding purpose of the federal law is the protection of 
investors. From this proposition the appellants argue that the 9~! 
state is doing nothing more in its law than im~ing additiona~ -- -
requirements that further protect investors. These additional 
protections are afforded b~lowing down the pace of tender 
offers~llowing target company management more time to review 
the offe~requiring much more extensive disclosure by the 
offeror regarding its financial and business condition, and 
c2)interposing approval of the offer by the State's regulatory 
commission. 
The appellees and the SEC argue, however, that the 
appellants have taken a one-sided view of the protections for 
the shareholders that Congress incorporated into the Williams 
Act. The legislative history of that Act shows that Congress 
was alert to the multiple interests of shareholders in the 
tender offer context. On the one hand, shareholders have an 
interest in ha.ving available to them the information regarding 
the offer and offeror that they need in order to make an 
intelligent decision about the offer. But equally important, 
they have an interest in not having offerors discouraged, and 
in not having unworkable and expensive burdens imposed on 
tender offers. Tender offers, as Congress recognized during 
1 50 
' . 
its lengthy deliberations on the proposals that eventually 
became the Williams Act, are often of great value to the 
shareholders of target companies; in a broader sense, the 
potential availability of tender offers is valuable to 
shareholders in almost all corporations as an incentive to 
efficient management. 
In balancing the need for disclosure against the 
desire to avoid discouraging tender offers, Congress made 
various decisions in structuring the requirements of the 
Williams Act. That Act has no requirement for any filing 
w~ 
'h ~ Wlt · 
lA..--' 
the SEC prior to the making of the offer. There is no ~M 
requirement that the offer receive prior approval from the SEC, 
and the offer may be interrupted and delayed only by an 
injunction. The required disclosures are limited. 
The Idaho statute has a pre-offer filing and 
disclosure requirement of the sort rejected by Congress. It 
also requires that commencement of the offer be delayed until 
the state regulatory body has reviewed the terms of the offer, 
held hearings, and approved the offer -- also a structure of 
regulation rejected by Congress. The practical upshot of the 
Idaho statute (as well as other state takeover laws), as the -
commentators have agreed, is to strengthen greatly the power of 
tender offer and, in the meantime, to take action that will 
result in the defeat of the takeover bid. 
In its own regulation of tender offers, Congress 
rejected such powers for the incumbent management of the target 
company. Accordingly, I think that the state's law must be 
viewed as pre-empted by the Williams Act. 
I should mention in closing that the appellants also 
argue that a tender offeror has no standing under the Williams 
Act to challenge the constitutionality of ' the state takeover 
statute. This argument is based on a misreading of Piper v~ 
Chris · Craft · Industries, 430 U.S. 1 (1977), where the Court held 
that an offeror does not have standing to sue for damages for 
noncompliance with the Williams Act. Here, the appellee is not 
suing for injunctive relief or for damages for noncompliance 
with the Williams Act. Rather, its suit rests on a 
constitutional claim under the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses 
to be free of the requirements of the Idaho statute. I see no 
problem of "standing" here. 
1 6 • 
BB 4/13/79 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-759, Kidwell ~ v; ~ ~reat · western ~ 5nited · Corp; 
'--....- . 
Luther Munford, one of Justice Blackmun's clerks, 
yesterday shared an interesting observation about this case 
with me. He pointed out that nowhere in the opinion of the CA 
5 or in the Briefs of the parties here has there been any 
discussion of the source of Great western United's riqht to 
maintain this action in federal court -- that is, the ~urc~ of ------
its "cause of action." Instead, attention has focused on the 
question of personal jurisdiction. 
Great Western's claim is that the Idaho statute 
contravenes the Supremacy Clause because it is inconsistent 
with the Williams Act. Given the position expressed in our 
opinion in ehapman, 42 u.s.c. §1983 does not provide a basis -
for Great Western's suit. We arque 1n ehapman that "laws" in 
§1983 includes only civil rights laws, among which the Williams 
' . 
Act does not number. And it would undercut this limitation on 
"laws" completely if the term "Constitution" in the statute 
were construed to include Supremacy Clause claims. On this 
latter point, I refer you to Justice Stevens' discussion in his 
opinion in ehapman of the comparable situation with respect to 
28 u.s.c. §1343 (copy attached). 
An alternative source for Great Western's cause of 
action is the Williams Act itself. But there is only a tenuous 
basis for supposing that the Williams Act creates a statutory 
right to be free of conflicting state laws, and even less 
support for the conclusion that it authorizes private suits in 
federal court to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief from 
such state laws. The argument on the former point rests on 
Section 28 of the 1934 Act, 15 u.s.c. § 78bb, which provides 
that: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any 
agency or officer performing like functions) of any 
State over any security or any person insofar as it 
does not conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 
Great Western might argue that by implication, Section 28 
prohibits state laws in conflict with the federal securities 
laws. If this is so, Great Western might continue, then the 
enforcement of such laws against it would violate Section 28, 
and Section 27 creates the cause of action Great Western 
asserts. 
Section 27, 15 u.s.c. §§78aa, provides 1n part: 
2. 
"Any suit or action to enforce any liability or 
duty created by this chapter or rules and 
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation 
of such chapter or rules and regulation, may be 
brought in any such district [where the violation 
occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant 
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business 
" 
Its own suit, Great Western would urge, seeks to enjoin a 
violation of Section 28, so it is authorized by Section 27. 
Section 27, however, actually leaves the crucial 
question unanswered. While it governs jurisdiction over the 
suits authorized by the 1934 Act, it does not define what those 
suits are; in particular, it does not authorize suits by 
private parties for declaratory and injunctive relief. Nor 
does any other section of the Williams Act explicitly authorize 
a private party to maintain such an action. 
Following the approach towards implied causes of 
action that we are working on in the eannon opinion, then, I 
would have to conclude that there 1s no authorization in the 
Williams Act for Great Western to claim declaratory and 
-----------------------------~------------------------------~-
injunctive relief from the Idaho statute. Nor do I think that 
----------~~ 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 u.s.c. §2201, should be read 
to create such a claim for relief. The purpose of §2201 is to 
allow federal causes of action otherwise maintainable in 
federal court to be pursued at an earlier stage in any given 
controversy, before actual damage has been sustained by the 
plaintiff. In terms of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 
U.S.C. §2201, Great Western does not have a right to a 
3. 
I 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Idaho statute, 
because Congress has not created such a right. The implication 
of this reasoning is that under current federal law, Great 
Western's Supremacy Clause claim could only be asserted as a 
defense to an action against it under the Idaho statute 1n the 
Idaho courts. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this memorandum, 
the appellants have not raised any question reqarding the basis 
for Great Western's suit. Since no issue of jurisdiction is 
implicated by the "cause of action" problem, I think that the 
Court would be justified in simply noting the problem and 
stating that the appellants have conceded any claim they might 
have had on this point. In other cases involving similar 
actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against state 
statutes on the ground that they conflicted with federal 
statutes, the Court has proceeded directly to the pre-emption 
question with no mention of the statutory basis for the 
plaintiffs' suit. ~ones ~ v~ · Rath · Facking · eo:, 430 u.s. 519 
(1977\; Dooqlas · v: · 8eacoast ~ Prodacts; A inc;, 431 u.s. 265 
(1977). 
I do think that it would be a qood idea to indicate 
the presence of the problem. As in eannon, there is an 
opportunity to point out here the need for precise analysis of 
the relief that Conqress affords to various parties, at various 
times during a g1ven controversy, in either federal or state 
courts. 
4. 
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II 
The statutory language suggests three different approaches 
to the jurisdictional issue. The first involves a consideration 
of the words "secured by the Constitution of the United 
States" as used in § 1343. The second focuses on the remedy 
authorized by § 1983 and raises the question whether that 
section is a statute that secures "equa.l rights" or "civil rights'' 
within the meaning of ~ 1343. The third approach makes the 
jurisdictional issue turn on whether the Social Security Act 
is a statute that secures "equal rights" or "civil rights." ·we 
consider these approaches in turn. 
1. The Suprenuu;y Clause 
Under ~ 1343 (3), Congress has crea~federal_Lurisdict!on 
of any civil action authorized by law to redress the depriva-
tion under color of state law "of any right, privilege. or immu-
nity secured [ 1] by the Constitution of the United States ot 
[2] by an act of Congress providing for equal rights of citi-
zens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States." Claimants correctly point out that the first preposi-
tional phrase ca.n be fairly read to describe rights secured by 
the Supremacy Clause: For even though that Clause is not a 
source of any federal rights, i't does "secure" federal rights by 
according them priority whenever they come in conflict with 
state law. 2 " In that sense all federal rights, whether created 
clniming that. n court ha:< pow<>r to grant rrlirf in hi~ behnlf ha:< the burden 
·of per::;un:;ion on tht' juri:;dictional i,-,-ue, .McNutt v. General Motonr 
Acceptauce Curp., 29~ lJ. S. II~, 189, r:;peeially II' hen hr i" pro<'t>Pding in 
n ronrt. of limited juri,.:diction. Tur11er, Admi11istrator , .. Hunk of Nurth 
AmNi.ca. 4 DaB. 8, II. 
~~~ "Tlw argnmrnt tlwt th<> phrn~r in the stntutt> 1:;t'cnrro Ly thr Con-
:<titution' rdrr:< to right:; 'cr<>:ltt'd,' rather than 'protectrd' b~· it, is not 
·1wr,;u:1,.:ive. Tht· prramule of t hr Con"t it ut.ion, procla iminK t hr establish-
mrnt of t hr Con:;t it ut ion in ordt>r 1 o '"Pl'IIT!' t hr Ble,-:::ing~ of Lil.Jt'rty,' USE':" 
the word '~c·rurr' in the ;;rn:o:c of 'protrct' or 'm:lkt> certain.' That. the 
phr:1se w:1,; u:;(•cl in thi,- :"Pli"P in the stHt11te now under con,.;idrnltion was: 
·rerognizPrl in Cartu v. Grcc11how, 114 U.S. 317, ~22, where it wa.~ hPid 
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by treaty, by statute, or by regulation., are "secured'' by the 
Suprcmar.y Clause. 
In Swift & Co. v. W1:c:kltam, 382 U. S. 111, the Court was 
confronted with an analogous choice between two interpreta-
tions of the statute uefining the jurisdiction of three-judge 
district courts.30 The comprehensive language of that statute. 
28 U. S. C. § 2281."' could have been broadly read to encom-
pass statutory claims secured by the Supremacy Clause or 
narrowly read to exclude claims that involve no federal con-
stitutional provision except that Clause. After acknowledg-
'ing that the broa.cler reading was consistent not only with the 
· statutory language but also with the policy of the statute, the 
)ourt accepted the more restrictive reading. I~ reasoningTs 
persuasive and app 1ca le to the problems confronting us in 
this case. 
"This restrictive view of the application of § 2281 is more 
as n maHer of plending that thn J)articuhr cause of·action set up on the 
plaintiff';:; pleading wa;: in contract and was not to redre;;.~ depriv;~tion of 
the 'right. secured to him by thnt clau"e of the Constitution' [the con-
tract clause], to which hP had 'cho~cn not t.o r~ort:' See, as to other 
right~ protectPd by the Con~t itufion :md lwnce f::f>cured L~· it, brought 
within the pro,·ision~ of R . S. § 5508, Logan \'. Unite.d States, 144 U. S. 
263; In rt' Quarles and Butlt'r, ISS U. S. 532: ['nited States v. Mosley, 
238 U. S. 383." llague "· C. I. 0., 301 U. S. 496, 526-527 (opinion of 
Stone, .T.). 
30 TIHI three-judgr court. :-:tntutl', including thE' language at i&;ue in 
Swift & Co. \' . Wickham, 382 11 . S. 11, was originally enacted in 1910, 
36 SUtt. 557, at a time when the Judicial Code of 1911 wn.s under Rctive 
con,;iclrra t ion. 
31 When Su•ift & Co. was decided, § 2281 providrd: 
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction rr.;training the enforcement, 
operation or execution of any Stnt<' stntute Ly rr.straining the action of 
:my officer of ~uch State in the Pnforeement or expcution of ~uch statute or 
of any order madr by an admini,;trative board or commi::;,:ion acting under 
State statutes, shall 110t be granted b~· an~· district rourt or judge thereof 
upon tht' ground of the uucu11slitutionality of such statute unlPs.s the ap-
plication thereof i. heard :1nd dPtPnnined by a di~trict C'ourt of throe · 
judge,; under Sl'Ction 22 -l of thi:; title." (Empha:;i:; Hdded.) 
• 
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-consistent with a discriminating reading of the statute 
itself than is the first a.nd more embracing interpretation. 
The statute requires a three-judge c'ourt in order to 
restrain the enforcement of a state statute 'upon the 
gl'Ound of the unconstitutionality of such sta.tute.' Since -all federal actions to enjoin a state enactment r~ti-
mately o1ltl1e SUP'rei11ac- Claus~, the words 'upon the 
groun o the unconstitutionality of such statute"'Wauld 
· appe~=to eXcTUde 
some typeS01'SU'ch mjunctive suits. For a simple provi-
.--~-:-:-:~ - --- --sion prohibiting the restraint of the enforcement of any 
state statute except by a three-judge court would mani-
festly have sufficed to embrace every such suit whatever 
its particular constitutional ground. It is thus quite 
permissible to read the phrase in question as one of 
limitation, sigi1ifying a congressional purpose to confine 
the three-judge court requirement to injunctive suits 
depending directly upon a substantive provision of the 
Constitution, leaving cases of conflict with a federal 
statute (or treaty) to follow their normal course in 'li 
single-judge court." Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 
111, 126-127. 
Just as the phrase in ~ 2281-"upon the ground of the 
unconstitutionality of such stature"-would have been super-
fluous unless read as a limitation on three-judge court juris-
diction , so is it equally clear that the entire reference in § 1343 
(3) to rights secured by au act of Congress would be unneces-
~ if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced 
those res tiiig"Soiely onthe Supremacy <:'la use. More impor-
tantly ~adition81 language wfiich describes a limited 
category of acts of Congress- those "providing for equal rights 
of citizens"-plainly nega.tes the notion that jurisdiction ovet 
all statutory claims had already been conferred by the pre-
ceding reference to constitutional claims. 
Thus, while· we recognize that there is force to claimants~ 
argument that the remedinl purpose of the civil rights leg-
77-719 & 77-5324-0PINION 
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islation supports an expansive interpretation of the phrase 
"secured by the Constitution," it would make little sense for 
Congress to have drafted the statute as it did 1f it had 
intended to co11fer jurisdiCtiOn over every conceivable federal 
claim against a sta.te agent. In order to give meaning to the 
entire statute as written by Congress, v;·e must conclude that 
an allegation of incompatibility betwe~n federal anCI state 
statutes and--regwailons does not, in itse"i.t""give rise to 1t - - . claim "secured by the Constitution" within the meaning of 
§ 13-43-(3-).-~------
2. Section 1983 
Claimants next argue that the "equal rights" language of 
§ 1343 (3) should not be read literaiiy or, if it is, that § 1983, 
the source of their asserted cause of action, should be consid-
ered an act of Congress "providing for equal rights' ' within 
the meaning of § 1343 (3) or "providing for the protection of 
civil rights" within § 1343 (4). In suppprt of this position, 
they point t.o the common origin of §' 1983 and § 1343 (3) in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and this Court's recognition that 
the latter is the jurisdictional counterpart of the former.~2 
Since broad language describing statutory claims was used in 
both provisions during the period betw-een 1874 and 1911 and 
has been retained in § 1983, ru1d since Congress in the JudiciaJ 
Code of 1911 purported to be making no changes in the exist-. 
· .. ing law as to jurisdiction in this a.rea, the 11equal rights" lan-
guage of § 1343 (3) must be construed to encompass all stl:ltU-· 
tory claims arising under the broader la.nguage of § 1983' .. 
Moreover. in view of its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1871' 
and its function in modern litigation. ~ 1983 does "provid[eJ 
for the protection of civil rights., within the meaning of 
'§ 1343 ( 4). 
~"See Lynch v. Household Fi11a11ce Corp .. 405 U. S. 538, 540, 543~ 
Examinino Board of Enoiueers, Architects & Surveyors v. D eOtero, 42(): 
'U. S. 572, 583. 
- ~~-
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SUPPLEM~NTAL - MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-759, Kidwell v. Great -western United Corp~ 
Luther Munford, one of Justice Blackmun's clerks, 
yesterday shared an interesting observation about this case with 
me. He pointed out that nowhere in the opinion of the CA 5 or 
in the Briefs of the parties here has there been any discussion 
of the source of Great Western United's rioht to maintain this 
action in federal court -- that is, the source of its "cause of 
action." The appellee's complaint mentions the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and 42 u.s.c. ~1983 as the laws unner which 
its claim arises. 
Great Western has two bases for attackinq the validity 
of the Idaho statute, the Commerce Clause and the pre-emption 
claim under the Supremacy Clause and the Williams Act. Given 
the construction of the term "Constitution" in ~1983 that we 
adopt in Chapman, ~1983 noes provide a cause of action for 
' . 
2. 
assertion of the Commerce Clause claim. But ~19B3 does not 
create a cause of action based on the contravention of the 
Williams Act by the Idaho statute. We arque in Chapman that 
"laws" in §1983 includes only civil riahts laws, amonq which th~ 
Williams Act noes not number. And it would undercut this 
limitation on "laws" completely if the term "Constitution" in 
§1983 were construed to include Supremacy Clause claims. On 
this latter point, I refer you to Justice Stevens' discussion in 
his opinion in Chapman of the comparable situation with respect 
to 28 u.s.c. ~1343. 
An alternative source for Great Western's cause of 
action is the Williams Act itself. But there is only a tenuous 
basis for supposing that the Williams Act creates a statutory 
right to be free of conflicting state laws, and even less 
support for the conclusion that it authorizes private suits in 
federal court to obtain declaratory and iniunctive relief from 
such state laws. 
The argument on the former ooint would overlap, I 
suppose, with the appellee's contentions reqarding the 
availability of oersonal iurisdiction under Section 27 of the 
1934 Act. This argument actually begins with Section 28 of the 
1934 Act, which provioes that: 
"Nothina in this chapter shall affect the 
iurisdiction of the securities commission (or anv 
aqencv or officer performing like functions) of any 
State over anv security or any person insofar as it 
does not conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 
Great Western has arqued, in connection with the question of 
jurisdiction, that Section 28 by implication prohibits state 
3. 
laws in conflict with the federal securitjes laws.* Granted 
this premise, it might arque also that a Private cause of action 
to enforce that prohibition should be implied under Section 28. 
Even assuming, as the appellee urqes, that Section 28 
was meant to do more than limit the pre-emptive effect of the 
1934 Act, there may be no warrant for implying a private cause 
of action to enforce in federal court the implieo limitation on 
state laws. It is true that under the 1934 Act, there is no 
apparent provision for enforcement of that limitation by the SEC 
in federal courts. Even if that is so, I see no particular 
problem with the conclusion that the pre-emptive effect of the 
Williams Act is to be left for assertion as a defense to an 
action by the State under the Idaho statute in the Idaho courts. 
The appellee also invoked the Declaratory Judgments 
Act, 28 u.s.c. ~2201, in its complaint. But as long as the 
concepts of jurisdiction and cause of action are to be separateo 
carefully, that Act cannot orovioe a cause of action for 
i--G1ven thfs construction of Section 28, the appellee has 
argued that enforcement of a state law inconsistent with the 
Williams Act constitutes a "violation" of that Act within the 
meaning of Section 27 of the 1934 Act. 
"Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this chapter or rules and regulations 
thereunder, or to enioin any violation of such 
chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in 
any such district fwherein anv act or transaction 
constitutinq the violation occurredl or in the 
district wherein the oefendant is found or is an 
inhabitant or transacts business •••• " 
The appellee argues that since some of the acts constituting the 
violation occurred in Texas, the suit properly was maintained 
there. 
4 • 
assertion of the pre-emption claim. The purpose of ~2201 is 
only to allow federal causes of action otherwise maintainable in 
federal court to be pursued at an earlier staqe in any qiven 
controvesy, before actual damaqe has been sustained by the 
plaintiff. In terms of the Declaratory Judgments Act, then, 
Great Western does not have a riqht to a declaration of the 
unconstitutionality of the Idaho statute because Conqress has 
not created a cause of action for such a declaration. 
As I mentioned at the beginninq of this memorandum, the 
appellants have not raised any question regardinq the basis for 
the appellee's SuPremacy Clause-Williams Act claim. Since no 
issue of jurisdiction is implicated by the "cause of action" 
problem, I think that the Court would be justified in simply 
notinq the problem and statinq that the appellnnts have conceded 
any claim they miqht have had on this point. In other cases 
involvinq similar actions for declaratory and iniunctive relief 
against state statutes on the ground that they conflicted with 
federal statutP.s, the Court has proceeded directly to the pre-
emption question with no mention of the statutory basis for the 
plaintiffs' suits. F.;q; ,,Jones v; Rath Packinq Co;, 430 U.S. 519 
(1977): Douglas v; Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
But I do think that it would be well at least to indicate the 
presence of the oroblem. As in Cannon, there is an opportunity 
here to point out the need for precise analysis of the relief 
that Conqress affords to various parties, at various times 
during a given controversy, in either federal or state courts. 
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'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-759 oP': 
;? 
David H. Leroy, Attorney Gen-
eral of Idaho, et al., 
Appellants, On Appeal from the United 
~ Great Wes~rn United ~~:t;:~~~~~ft:pealsfor 
1 p,........ ~ Corporation. [May -, 
1979
] 
0 ~ MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
~;._._,~~-An Idaho statute imposes restrictions on certain purchasers 
fl" r v · f stock in corporations having substantial assets in Idaho. 
,/j The questions presented by this appeal are whether the state 
.MV J r agents responsible for enforcing the statute may be required 
&P' · ... JT{ to defend its constitutionality in a federal district court in 
~xas, and if so, whether the statute conflicts with the 
Williams Act amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934/ and the Commerce Clause of the United States 
• • Constitution.2 
Sunshine Mining and Metal Co. (Sunshine) is a "target 
company" within the meaning of the Idaho Corporate Take-
over Act--a statute designed to regulate takeovers of corpora-
tions that have certain connections to the State.3 Sunshine's 
1 82 Stat. 454, see 15 U.S. C.§§ 78m (d)-78m (e), 77n (d)-78n (f). 
2 ·'The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the seV'eral States, and with the Indian 
Tribe~ .... " U. S. ConRt., Art. I, § 8. 
3 Chapter 15 of Title 30 of the Idaho ·code is entitled "Corporate Take-
overs." Its opening provision contains the following definition: 
"'Target company' means a corporation or other issuer of securitiPs 
which is organized under the laws of this state or has its principal office m 
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principal business is a silver mining operation in the Coeur 
d'Alene Mining District in Idaho. Its executive offices and 
most of its assets are located in the State. Sunshine is also 
engaged in business in New York and, through a subsidiary, 
in Maryland. Its stock is traded over the New York Stock 
Exchange, and its shareholders are dispersed throughout the 
country. App. 36. It is a Washington corporation. 439 F. 
Supp. 420, 423-424. 
Great Western United Corporation (Great Western) is an 
"offeror" within the meaning of the Idaho statute.4 Great 
Western is a publicly owned Delaware corporation with execu-
tive headquarters in Dallas, Tex., and corporate offices in 
Denver, Colo. App. 131. In early 1977, Great Western de-
cided to make a public offer to purchase 2 million shares of 
Sunshine stock for a premium price. Because consummation 
of the proposed tender offer would cause Great Western to 
own more than 5% of Sunshine's outstanding shares, Great 
Western was required to comply with certain provisions of the 
Williams Act and arguably also to comply with the Idaho 
this state, which has substantial assets located in this state. whosP equity 
securities of any class are or have been registered under chapter 14, title 30, 
Idaho Code, or predecessor laws or section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and which is or may be involved in a takeover offer relating 
to any class of its equity securities." Idaho Code § 30-1501 (6) (emphasis 
added). 
4 " 'Offeror' means a person who makes or in an~· way participates irt 
making a take-over offer, and includes all affiliates and associates of that 
person, and all persons acting jointly or in concert for the purpose of ac-
quiring, holding or disposing of or exercising any voting rights attached to 
the equity securities for which a take-over offer is made." 
"'Take-over offer' means the offer to acquire or the acquisition of any 
equity security of a target company, pursuant to a tender offer or request 
or invitation for tenders, if after the acquisition thereof the offeror would 
be directly or indirectly a beneficial owner of more than five per cent 
(5%) of any clas~ of the outstanding equity securities of the issuer." 
Idaho Code§§ 30-1501 (3), (6). 
' ' 
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Corporate Takeover Act as well as with similar provisions of 
New York and Maryland. 
On March 21 , 1977, Great Western publicly announced its 
intent to make a tender offer for 2 million shares of Sunshine, 
and its representatives took simultaneous steps to implement 
the proposed tender offer. They filed a Schedule 13D with 
the Securities Exchange Commission in Washington disclosing 
the information required by the Williams Act. They con-
sulted with state officials in Idaho, New York, and Maryland 
about compliance with the corporate takeover laws of those 
States. And they filed documents with the Idaho Commis-
sioner of Finance in an attempt to satisfy Idaho's statute. 
On March 25, 1957, Melvin Baptie, who was then the 
Deputy Administrator of Securities of the Idaho Department 
of Finance, sent a telecopy letter of objections to Great West-
ern's filing to the company's offices in Dallas. The letter 
stated that certain pages of Great Western's SEC Form 13D 
were missing, asked for several additional items of informa-
tion, and indicated that no hearing would be scheduled, nor 
other action taken, until all of the requested information had 
been received. App. to Juris. Statement, at A-156 to A-164.' 
On the same day Tom McEldowney, the Director of Finance 
of Idaho, entered an order delaying the effective date of the 
tender offer. !d., at A-165 to A-166. Gr€at Western made 
no response to Baptie's letter or to McEldowney's order. 
On March 28, 1977, Great Western filed this action in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas, naming as defendants the sta.te officials responsible for 
enforcing the Idaho, New York, and Maryland takeover laws. 
The complaint prayed for a declaration that the state laws 
were invalid insofar as they purported to apply to interstate 
cash tender offers to purchase securities traded on the national 
exchange. App., at 1-36. The cla.ims against the Maryland 
and New York defendants were dismissed because the former 
-did not attempt to enforce their statute against Great Western 
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and the latter expressly stated that they would not assert 
jurisdiction over the proposed tender offer. 439 F. Supp., at 
428-429. The two Idaho defendants-McEldowney, the Di~ 
rector of Finance, and Wayne Kidwell, then Attorney General 
of the State "-appeared specially to contest 'jurisdiction 
venue, and the merits of the claim. 
The District Court found four separate statutory bases for 
federal jurisdiction.n It held that personal jurisdiction over 
the Idaho defendants had been obtained by service pursuant 
to the Texas longarm statute.7 It concluded, however, that 
venue was improper under the general federal venue statute, 
28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b) ,8 because the defendants obviously did 
not reside in Texas and the claim arose in Idaho rather than in 
Texas. Nonetheless, it decided that venue could be sustained 
under the special venue provision in § 27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act). 15 U. S. C. §§ 78aa. 
See nn. 9 and 10, infra, and accompanying text. 
On the merits, the District Court held that the Idaho Take-
over Act is pre-empted by the Williams Act and places an 
impermissible burden on interstate commerce. It granted in~ 
junctive relief that enabled Great Western to acquire the de-
sired Sunshine shares in the Fall of 1977. 439 F. Supp., at 
434-440. That acquisition did not moot the case, however, 
5 Baptie, who wrote the letter of comment on March 25, 1977, wa.;; not 
named as a defendant. David H. Leroy has now replaced Kidwell as 
Attorney General of the Gtate. 
c; "The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case on four 
bases: 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (general federal question), 28 U. S. C. § 1332 
(diversity), 28 U. S. C. § 1337 (acts affecting commerce) and Section 27 
of the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78aa] ." 439 F . 
Supp., at 430. 
7 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat., art. 2031. 
8 Section 1391 (b) provides: 
" [C]ivil actions in which jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity 
of citizenship may be brought in the judicial district 'where all defendants 
reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.',. 
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"because the question whether Great Western has violated 
Idaho's statute will remain open unless and until the District 
Court's judgment is finally affirmed. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. The court sustained federal subject matter 
jurisdiction on the same four grounds relied upon by the Dis-
trict Court. See n. 6, supra. It then advanced alternate 
theories in support of both its determination that the District 
Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants and its 
conclusion that venue lay in the Northern District of Texas. 
First, it noted that the Texas longarm statute authorized the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the 
fullest extent allowable under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It then held that an Idaho official 
who seeks to enforce an Idaho statute to prevent a Texas-
based corporation from proceeding with a national tender offer 
has SPfficient contacts with Texas to support jurisdiction. 
Second, it held that jurisdiction was available under § 27 of 
the 1934 Act,9 which gives the federal district courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over suits brought "to enforce any ... duty 
created" by the Act. It based this holding on the theory that 
Idaho's enforcement attempts, by conflicting with the Wil-
liam~ Act, constituted a violation of a "duty" impoEed by 
9 "The district courts of tho United States, ... shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations there-
under, and of all suits in equity or actions at law brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations there-
under. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein 
any act or transaction constituting the violation oecurred. Any suit or 
action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules 
and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter 
or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the 
district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts 
business, and process in such catieS may be served in any other district of 
which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be 
'found . . .. " 15 U.S. C.§ 78aa. 
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§ 28 (a) of the Act.10 It relied on the same reasoning to sup. 
port its conclusion that venue was authorized by § 27 of the 
1934 Act. Finally, disagreeing with the District Court, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that venue in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas was also proper under the general federal venue 
provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (b), because the allegedly invalid 
restraint against Great Western occurred there and it was 
accordingly "the judicial district ... in which the claim 
arose." 577 F. 2d, at 1265-1274. On the merits, the Court 
of Appeals agreed with the analysis of the District Court. 
/d., at 1274-1296. 
We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. - U. S. -. 
Without reaching either the merits or the constitutional ques-
tion arising out of the attempt to assert personal jurisdiction 
over appellants, we now reverse because venue did not lie in 
the Northern District of Texas. 
I 
The question of personal jurisdiction, which goes to the 
court's power to exercise control over the parties, is typically 
decided in advance of venue, which is primarily a matter of 
choosing a convenient forum. See generally Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3801. at 5-6 (1976). 
On the other hand, neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is 
fundamentally preliminary in the sense that subject matter 
jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defend-
ant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and both may' 
be waived by the parties. See Olberding v. Illinois Central R. 
Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 
U. S. 165, 167-168. Accordingly, when there is a sound pru-
10 Section 28 provides, in pertinent. part: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the juri:sdiction of the securities com-
mission (or any agency or officer pprforming like functions) of any State 
over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 1& 
u.s. c.§ 78bb. 
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dential justification for doing so, we conclude that a court may 
reverse the normal order of considering personal jurisdiction 
and venue. 
Such a justification exists in this case. Although for the 
reasons discussed in Part II, infra, it is clear that § 27 of the 
1934 Act does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction, the 
question whether personal jurisdiction was properly obtained 
pursuant to the Texas longarm statute is more difficult. In~ 
deed, because the Texas Supreme Court has construed its 
statute as authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over non-
residents to the fullest extent permitted by the United States 
Constitution,n resolution of this question would require the 
Court to decide a question of constitutional law that it has 
not heretofore decided. As a prudential matter it is our prac-
tice to avoid the unnecessary decision of novel constitutional 
questions. We find it appropriate to pretermit the constitu-
tional issue in this case because it is so clear tha.t venue was 
improper under either § 27 of the 1934 Act or under § 1391 (b) 
of the Judicial Code. 
II 
The linchpin of Great Western's argument that venue is 
provided by § 27 of the 1934 Act is its interpretation of 
§ 28 (a) of that Act. See nn. 9-10, supra. It reads § 28 as 
imposing an affirmative "duty" on the State of Idaho, the 
violation of which may be redressed in the federal courts 
under § 27. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said of a similar 
11 E. g., U-Achor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S. W. 2d 760 (Tex. 1977) . 
Appellants argue that this construction is only applicable to private com-
mercial defendants and should not govern either in a suit against the 
agents of another sovereign state or in one against persons who are not 
engaged in commercial endeavors . Both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals , however, have concluded that the statute does extend to the 
limits of the Due Process Clau~e in this case, and it is not our practice· 
to re-examine state-law determinations of this kind. E. g., Butner v. 
United States, - U. S.-, - ; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, ~45-346,, 
and n. 8; Pmpper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487. 
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argument in a similar case, however, "[t]his is a horse soon 
curried." Olberding, supra, 346 U. S., at 340. 
The reference in § 27 to the "liabilit[ies] or dut[ies] created 
by this chapter" clearly corresponds to the various provisions 
in the 1934 Act that explicitly establish duties for certain par-
ticipants in the securities market or that subject such persons 
to possible actions brought by the Government, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, or private litigants.u Section 28 
is not such a provision. There is nothing in its text or its 
legislative history to suggest that it imposes any duty on the 
States or that indicates who might enforce any such duty. 
The section was plainly intended to protect, rather than to 
limit, state authority.1 a Because ~ 28 imposed no duty on 
petitioner, the argument that § 27 establishes venue in the 
District Court is unsupportable. 
12 E. g., § 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a) ("It shall be 
unlawful for any person ... to solicit ... any proxy ... in contravention 
of such rules as the Commission may prescribe .... ") (emphasis added); 
id., § 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) ("For the purpose of preventing the 
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by [the] benefi-
cial owner [of 10% of any class of equity security], director, or officer by 
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from 
any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equitr security of 
such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less 
than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connec-
tion with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable 
by the iss.uer . ... " (Emphasis added); id., § 17 (a)(1), 15 U.S. C. 
§ 78q (a) (1). ("Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, 
every broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the 
medium of any such member, every registered securities association, and 
every broker or dealer registered pursuant to [15 U. S. C. § 7861 shall 
make, keep, and. preserve . . . such accounts . . . and make such re-
ports . . . as the Commission by its rules and regulations may pre-
scribe .... ") (emphasis added). 
18 Thomas Corcoran, a principal draftsman of the 1934 Act, indicated 
to Congress that the purpose of § 28 was to leave the States with as much 
leeway to regulate securities transactions as the Supremacy Clau e would 
~llow them in the absen~e of such a provision. Senate Committee on · 
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select an unfair or inconvenient place of triaP5 For that 
reason, Congress has generally not made the residence of the 
plaintiff a oasis for venue in nondiversity cases. But cf. 28 
U. S. C. § 1391 (e). The desirability of consolidating similar 
claims in a single proceeding may lead defendants, such per-
haps as the New York and Maryland officials in this case, to 
waive valid objections to otherwise improper venue. But 
that concern does not justify reading the statute to give the 
plaintiff the right to select the place of trial that best suits his 
convenience. So long as the plain language of the statute 
does not open the severe type of "venue gap" that the amend-
ment giving plaintiffs the right to proceed in the district where 
the claim arose was designed to close,16 there is no reason to 
read it more broadly on behalf of plaintiffs.17 
Moreover, the plain language of § 1391 (b) will not bear 
the Court of Appeals' interpretation. The statute allows 
venue in "the judicial district ... in which the claim arose." 
Without deciding whether this language adopts the occa-
sionally fictive assumption that a claim may arise in only one 
district,18 it is absolutely clear that Congress did not intend to 
16 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U. S. 484, 493-494; 
Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, :387 
U. S. 556, 560 ; Nierbo, supra, 308 U. S., at 168; Reuben H. Donnelley 
Corp. v. F'l'C, 580 F. 2d 264, 269 (CA7 1978), 
16 See Brunette Machine Works v. Kokum lndust1·ies, 406 U. S. 706, 
710, and n. 8. As Brunette indicates, the amendment of § 1391 to provide 
for venue where the claim aro~c wa:; designrd to close the "venue gap" 
that exi;;ted under earlier vrrsionR of tlw stntutr in situntionH in which 
joint tortfeasors, or other multiple defendant1> who contributed to a single 
injurious act, could not be sued jointly because they resided in different 
d ' -tricts. !d., at 710 n. 8. In this case, by contrast, Great Western has 
attempted to join in one suit three srparat.e claims-each challenging a 
different statute--aga,inst three sets of drfcndant8 from threr States. The 
statute simply dces not contemplntr such a choice on thr part of plaintiffs. 
17 "The requirement of venue is SJJf'Cific and unambiguous; it. is not one 
of those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy, 
is to be given a 'liberal' construction." Olberding, supra, 346 U. S., at 340. 
' 8 The two sides of this question, and the cn.,;es supporting each, are 
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provide for venue at the residence of the plaintiff or to give 
that party an unfettered choice among a host of different dis-
tricts. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 
560. Rather, it restricted venue either to the residence of the 
defendants or to "a place which may be more convenient to 
the litigants"-i. e. , both of them-"or to the witnesses who 
are to testify in the case." S. Rep. No. 1752, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1963). See Denver & R. G. W., supra, at 560. See also 
Brunette Machine Works v. Kokum Industries, 406 U.S. 706, 
710. In our view, therefore, the broadest interpretation of 
the language of § 1391 (b) tha.t is even arguably acceptable is 
that in the unusual case in which it is not clear that the claim 
arose in only one specific district/0 a plaintiff may choose be-
tween those two (or conceivably even more) districts that 
with approximately equal plausibility- in terms of the avail-
ability of witnesses, the accessibility of other relevant evi-
dence, and the convenience of the defendant (but not of the 
plaintiff)- may be assigned as the locus of the claim. Cf. 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U. S. 484, 493-494. 
This case, is not, however, unusual. For the claim involved 
has only one obvious locus-the District of Idaho. Most im-
portantly, it is action that was taken in Idaho by Idaho resi-
dents-the enactment of the statute by the legislature, the 
review of Great Western's filing and the forwarding of the 
comment letter by Deputy Administrator Baptie, and the 
entry of the order postponing the effective date of the tender 
by Finance Director McEldowney-as well as the future ac-
tion that may be taken in the State by its officials to punish 
or to remedy any violation of its law, that provide the basis 
for Great Western 's federal claim. For this reason, the bulk 
of the relevant evidence and witnesses-apart from employees 
discussed in 1 J. Moore, supra, ~ 0.142 [5.-2] , at 1426-1435 ; Wright, Mil-
ler & Cooper, supra, § 3806, at 28-34. 
19 See ALI, Study of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, 
Commentary to Proposed Final Draft, at 80-81 (1965) . 
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of the plaintiff, and securities experts who come from all over 
the United States ~0-is also located in the State Less impor-
tant, but nonetheless relevant, the nature of this action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a state statute makes venue in 
the District of Idaho appropriate. The merits of Great West-
ern's claims may well depend on a proper interpretation of the 
State's statute, and federal judges sitting in Idaho are better 
qualified to construe Idaho law, and to assess the character of 
Idaho's probable enforcement of that law, than are · judges 
sitting elsewhere. See cases cited in n. 11, supra. 
We therefore reject the Court of Appeals' reasoning that 
the "claim arose" in Dallas because that is where Great West-
ern proposed to initiate its tender offer, and that is where 
Idaho's statute had its impact on Great Western. Aside from 
the fact that these "contacts" between the "claim" and the 
Texas district fall far short of those connecting the claim and 
the Idaho district, we note that this reasoning would subject 
the Idaho officials to suit in almost every district in the coun-
try. For every prospective offeree-be he in New York, Los 
Angeles, Miami, or elsewhere, rather than in Dallas-could 
argue with equal force (or Great Western could argue on his 
behalf) that he had intended to direct his local broker to 
accept the tender and was frustrated in that desire by the 
Idaho law.21 As we noted above. however, sucp a reading of 
§ 1391 (b) is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the 
20 At the trial held in the Northern District of Texas, the witness roHter, 
in addition to various Idaho officials and Great Western employees from 
Dallas, mainly included experts from the New York area as well as one 
each from California, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin. App., at 100-292. 
21 Sunshine's shareholders are located in 49 States as well a~:> the Di~:>tl'ict 
of Columbia and Puerto Rico. App., at 36. 
22 In De-nver & R. G. W., the Court concluded that the drafters of 
§ 1391 (b) did not intend to provide venue in suits against unincorporated 
associations in every district in which a member of the association resided. 
To do so, it noted would give the plaintiff an unrestrained choice of 
venues and would accordingly be "patently unfair" to the defendant. 387 
U. S., at 560. A like reasoning is controlling here. 
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provision, for it would leave the venue decision entirely in the 
hands of plaintiffs, rather than making it "primarily a matter 
of the convenience of litigants and witnesses." Denver & 
R. G. W., supra, 387 U. S., at 560.22 In short, the District of 
Idaho is the only one in which "the claim arose" within the 
meaning of § 1391 (b). 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
CH AM BERS OF 
.§n:putttt Qfltlttt of flr.t ~t.tb ~htt.ts< 
~aglfin:ghtn. ~. QJ. 21l.;t.l!~ 
JUSTICE J OHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 22, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 78-759 - Leroy v. Great Western 
United Corporation 
J 
Although I realize that a majority of the 
Court was prepared to reverse on the ground that 
there was no personal jurisdiction in Texas over 
the Idaho official, I am hopeful that you may 
find my reliance on the Ctear absence of proper 
venue ac~taQle. I did have some diff1cu!EY 
w1th the implications of a jurisdictional holding 
and believe it is proper to avoid that constitutional 
question when a simple statutory answer is available. 
I try to justify this approach in Part I on pages 




JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~nprtme <!:onrt l,f tltc~tnitd~ $>tah•s 
'Jillagftinl1t~,tt, ~. <!J. 2!l,?J~;l · 
May 23, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Due to a mix-up, an earlier memorandum 
circulated today advised that I was considering a 
dissent in No. 78-1060, Great Western Sugar Co. 
Vo Edward L. Nelson. In fact, the case is 
No. 78-759, Leroy v. Great Western United Corporation. 
Please substitute the attached corrected memorandum 
for the earlier one. 
Sincerely, 
~u.vumt <qctt.tt Gf ttrt :p-ttittb .§~aUg 
~ailfrhtgi(Jlt, ~. <q. 20pJt.~ · 
<:HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 23, 1979 
Re: No. 78-759 -- Leroy v. Great Western 
United Corporation 
Dear John: 




Mr. Justice Stevens 
,4' ,tl.J t' :4.L. 
Copies to the Conference 
-
May 26, 1979 
78-759 Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
i'u:prttttt <!fourllli t!tt ~.tb i'taf;tg 
jirulfingt~ ~· <!f. 2llgt~~ 
May 29, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 78-759 - Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
sincerely,r 
Mr. Justice Stevens 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-759, Leroy · v~ · Great · western United Corp. 
I have reviewed Justice White's dissent, and recommend 
that you stay with Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court. 
Justice White accepts at least two arguments that you have 
considered and rejected. First, he concludes that some part of 
the alleged "violation" by the Idaho officials occurred in 
Texas. Second, he decides that the activities of the Idaho 
officials in enforcing their statute amounts to a "violation" of 
the Williams Act (within the meaning of § 27 of that Act) if the 
state statute has been preempted by the federal law. 
' ' 
2. 
I also call to your attention Section II of Justice 
White's opinion, because it contains a pernicious idea that 
should be guarded against in the future. He states that there 
are "no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents." This 
argument has been advanced by the SG in recent cases, including 
this one, so it probably will reappear in the future. As I 
understand the argument, it amounts to the assertion that so far 
as the Due Process Clause is concerned, any federal court may 
acquire personal jurisdiction over any resident of the United 
States, so long as service of process is sufficient to qive the 
notice required by the Constitution and to meet whatever 
statutory requirements may be applicable. 
This seems to me to be totally at odds with the kind of 
fairness analysis adopted in International -Shoe. Suppose, for 
example, that the federal securities laws provided that a suit 
under those statutes could be maintained in any federal court, 
and that service of process could be made anywhere in country. 
Under the statutes, it would be possible for a New York investor 
defrauded by a New York broker to brinq suit in Montana, and 
secure personal iurisdiction for the federal court in Montana, 
by serving process on the defendant in New York. I suqqest that 
such personal iurisdiction would be in contravention of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
BB 4/24/79 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-759, Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. 
I recommend that you join Justice Stevens opinion for 
the Court. His preference for deciding the case on venue 
grounds is explained and justified in Section I of his opinion, 
beginning on p. 6. I think that his arguments there are 
convincing. 
In Section II of the opinion, Justice Stevens makes 
short work of the claim that venue (and, by implication, 
personal jurisdiction) are proper under § 27 of the 1934 Act. 
We have discussed these arguments before, and I think that 
Justice Stevens reaches the correct resolution. 
2. 
Section III is obviously the difficult section of the 
opinion. In it, Justice Stevens presents his reasons for 
concluding that Great Western United's claim arose in Idaho 
rather than Texas within the meaning of the general venue 
statute. He gives the following reasons: In general, statutory 
restrictions on venue are meant to protect defendants from 
----~'-'~ ---
having to defend in courts that have personal jurisdiction but 
in which defense of the lawsuit would be unfair or inconvenient. 
This purpose is evident from the failure to specify the 
residence of the plaintiff as a basis for venue except in a few 
limited types of actions. Construing the statutory allowance 
for venue in the district where the claim arises, with this 
general purpose in mind, indicates that in a case such as this 
one, the claim should be considered to have arisen in Idaho. 
See pp. 11-12 of Justice Stevens' opinion. 
The dissent is likely to raise two objections to 
Justice Stevens argument in Section III. First, it will argue 
that because the actions of the Idaho officials had an impact on 
Great Western in its activities in Texas, the claim of Great 
Western should be considered to have arisen there. Justice 
Stevens has said about all there is to say on this point at p. 
12 of his opinion. I would describe his approach to this 
argument as a balancing of relative convenience, with the scale 
tipped at the outset towards the interests of the defendants 
3. 
because of the general statutory policy of protecting defendants 
from unfair or inconvenient venue. 
The dissent will probably argue, second, that Justice 
Steven has created a so-called venue gap of the sort that recent 
amendments to§ 1391 were meant to eliminate. Before these 
amendments, venue under§ 1391(b) was proper only in a district 
in which all of the defendants resided. Because in situations 
of multiple defendants this often made venue with respect to all 
defendants improper in every district, the statute was amended 
to provide also for jurisdiction in the district where the claim 
arose. The dissent will argue that by taking the position he 
has, Justice Stevens has created a comparable venue gap by 
forcing plaintiffs such as Great Western to sue each state with 
a takeover statute in the federal district court in that state. 
My own view is that this is a red herring. Great 
Western and other corporations in a similar situation do not 
have a single cause of action against multiple defendants. 
Rather, they have separate claims arising out of each State's 
corporate takeover statute. Each claim may be pursued in a 
separate action, since each presumably will raise unique 
questions because of the particular provisions of the state 
statute at issue. 
Justice Stewart has joined Justice Stevens' opinion; 
Justice White has indicated his plan to file a dissenting 
opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
~ltpt"tttt.t Qftturl ttf flrt ~h ,jtattg 
~a,g!p:ttghnt. ~. aJ. 211&1'!.~ 
Junell,l979 
/ 
RE: No. 78-759 Leroy v. Great Western United Corporation 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in the dissent you have prepared in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 







JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 12, 1979 




Although my first preference was to decide the case 
on the personal jurisdiction issue, the route you have 
chosen is acceptable. My vote will ~ive you a Court, 
and I therefore join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
j~a£ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBI!:RS o..-
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~~~:e'J&U' "fUUT~ DT Uf~ ~l)' ~UUt.iJ 
~asqingbtn. ~. ~· 20~'!~ 
June 12, 1979 
Dear John: 
Re: 78-759 Leroy v. Great Western 
I am satisfied to dispose of this case on 
venue grounds. I am equally satisfied that Texas 
had no jurisdiction. 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
r;;·· 0 
.§uprtmt <.!Joud of tq~ 'J!tnit~b .§taftg 
'magfrington, ~. <.!J. 2llpJ!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 21, 1979 
Re; No. 7 8..- 7 59 .,.. Leroy v. · Great Western United Corp. 
Dear Byron; 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
I. .111. 
T.M. 
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